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Elite Continuity in Ukraine:  
When Networks Matter (?) 
Tetiana Kostiuchenko  
Abstract: »Kontinuität der Elite in der Ukraine: Wenn Netzwerke wirken (?)«. 
The first part of the paper contains analysis of elite reproduction/circulation in 
Ukraine in 2002-2011, taking two political power branches – legislative and 
executive – at the national level. In the second part of the paper empirical evi-
dence showing connectedness of various elite groups by circulation patterns is 
presented. The last part of the paper suggests interpretation of the network 
functioning throughout the aforementioned period due to various subgroups 
and positions of individuals (i.e. MPs and ministers). The impact of network 
density and cohesion is evaluated with the legislative initiatives submitted by 
the elite members. 
Keywords: political elites, circulation, network analysis, Ukraine. 
 
Fourteen years after the collapse of the USSR, Ukraine experienced the “Or-
ange Revolution” – a peaceful uprising of the citizenry that began as a protest 
against electoral fraud in the presidential election, and evolved into a mass 
expression of discontent with the country’s political leadership. In December 
2004 street protests forced the incumbent regime to agree to hold a repeat vote, 
and in January 2005 Viktor Yushchenko, the opposition candidate, was sworn 
in as President with a promise to institute sweeping changes in the way the 
country was governed. 
Almost five years after the “orange” events, the pervasiveness of voter dis-
appointment in the perceived lack of change in the country’s development 
vector seems to suggest that so-called “replacement circulation” (Higley and 
Pakulski 2000, 113) did not occur within Ukraine’s political elite after 2004. 
Instead, as it was the case in the years following the collapse of the USSR, 
current popular opinion in Ukraine suggests that many incumbent actors ma-
naged to retain their power positions and statuses. 
As discussed in the first part of this paper, in the aftermath of the collapse of 
the USSR, elite reproduction was more evident than circulation in Ukraine, as 
indicated by several studies. In the second part of the paper the empirical evi-
dence showing elite circulation (though not complete replacement) over the 
post-Soviet period is presented. As discussed in the third section of the paper, 
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the ‘staying power’ of particular subsets of Ukraine’s political elite is based on 
the network connections between and with its members. The analysis of net-
work positions of the interlocking actors is presented in the final part of the 
paper. 
Defining ‘elites’ in the Post-Socialist State 
Higher social layers in the post-Socialist states are widely studied through the 
elite theory paradigm focusing on elite transformations (Burton and Higley 
2001, 181-99), elite recruitment (Lane and Ross 1999) and formation of new 
elite groups (Szabo 2010, 13-40) along with the other elite-related issues. 
However, it is still an open question what relational structures might evolve 
between power groups binding elite members and thus enabling patronage to 
develop. This issue becomes essential to be explored in the societies where 
interest groups or informality mechanisms might become the basis for the 
creation of an internally circulating ‘ruling class’. 
Following Pareto, the term “political elite” is defined according to positional 
criteria: individuals who occupy the highest posts within the executive (Cabinet 
of Ministers and Presidential Administration/Secretariate) and legislative 
(Members of Parliament) branches of government argued to be the political 
elite.1  
To measure the degree of circulation/reproduction in Ukraine’s political 
elite biographies of parliamentary deputies and ministers (available from public 
sources) are analyzed for this study. This enables obtaining the snapshots of the 
composition of the political elite during various time periods which can then be 
compared. However, in addition to providing a measurement of elite circula-
tion/replacement over time, comparing elite member biographies at an individ-
ual level (i.e. identifying common experiences of two or more individuals at the 
same time) allows one to ascertain possible informal linkages between elite 
members that may not be reflected in official party or faction affiliations. 
Elites Through Social Network  
Analysis (SNA) Perspective 
For the recent decades, the concept of social/network capital, advantageous 
positions and power in networks were developed by various social scientists 
(Lin 2001, Burt 2005). They have proved that connections between individuals 
                                                             
1  This definition is an option to define the boundaries of the ‘ruling class’, but it is used in 
this paper, firstly, because it excludes a normative analysis of whether elite members merit 
their position, and secondly, because it assumes that real political power is held by those 
who occupy top positions. 
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and groups are the basis for the formation of social capital, and therefore the 
crucial component of successful social activity, and upward mobility in particu-
lar.  
The wide range of literature on elite affiliations shows that such informal in-
terpersonal connections within economic and political elite circles have at-
tracted both, academic and practical research interest throughout the world. In 
several studies, Mark Granovetter developed the concept of social embedded-
ness showing that individuals and groups act in a web of interconnections and 
mutual commitments and expectations (Granovetter 1985, 481-510); William 
Domhoff and Michael Useem investigated ‘interlocking directorates’ in the US 
corporate community and political sphere developing Charles Wright Mills’ 
idea of the ‘ruling circles’ (Domhoff 1970, Useem 1983); David Stark and 
Balasz Vedres applied these approaches to investigate affiliations between 
business and politics in Hungary during the period of transition (Stark and 
Vedres 2001).  
The key role of informal ties in fostering co-operation between power au-
thorities in new EU member-states – Czech Republic, Slovenia, Romania and 
Bulgaria – was studied and compared by Åse Grødeland (2007, 217-52). Ap-
pealing to connections remains relatively widespread in the region even after 
the collapse of the USSR as a resource for recruiting employees, gaining ad-
vantageous access to particular positions and earning profits. As argued by 
Miller and others, it is the common and first-choice practice throughout post-
Soviet countries to appeal to connections with government officials or other 
authorities when solving different issues (Miller et al. 2001). Another study 
conducted recently by Polese and Rogers, focuses on the informality among 
small and medium businesses in CEE states showing how the entrepreneurs 
deal with structural constraints – the taxation, regular audits, fines, contracts, 
etc. – through the network mechanisms (Polese and Rogers 2011, 612-18).  
This kind of informality in getting things done is argued to be the reaction to 
institutional instability providing ways of survival in a society experiencing 
rapid social, political and economic changes. 
Thus, the main research questions of the paper are:  
a. what clusters existed in Ukrainian political elites during the last 10 years, 
and especially whether the composition of clusters changed after the presi-
dential and parliamentary elections in 2004 and 2010 respectively;  
b. whether we can trace any evidence of the network capital impact in the 
‘surviving power’ of the elite members;  
c. how the centrality of actors varies among the groups by their surviving 
power, specifically, whether those who are ‘survivors’ tend to be more cen-
tral in the network.  
The use of the social network analysis (SNA) approach to the investigating 
relational structures of political elites is based on several arguments. First, it 
enables the depiction of status-roles interaction between actors who occupy 
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governing positions (Knoke 1990). Being related to the studies of communica-
tion processes and resource exchange, it includes the analysis of how social 
capital is accumulated – particularly based on the statement that network inter-
action assures the stability of the whole social structure (Lin 2001). Finally, the 
network perspective broadens analyses of inter-individual connections by fo-
cusing on interpersonal ties that are flexible, but at the same time not limited to 
exact groups which brings a dynamic aspect into the analysis (Wellman 1988, 
19-61). 
Methodology and Data 
The empirical stage included mapping of five types of ties (political, business, 
non-governmental, educational, kinship) between political elite members based 
on overlapping biographical experiences/common affiliations. Joint legislative 
initiatives gave the additional verification of the appeal to common experiences 
among political elite members. They were traced during the interviews and 
through the open database on the web-page of the Verkhovna Rada of 
Ukraine2.  
The research strategy was the following:  
1) to compare the composition of political elite (2002-2010);  
2) to extract the group of ‘survivors’ who managed to stay in power during the 
last decade; 
3) to analyze the network ties of ‘survivors’, to check the level of cohesion, 
centrality of particular actors, etc. – with regard to the potential of this group 
to stay in power after 2012 elections.  
The final dataset contains political actors at highest positions in the executive 
and legislative power branches. UCINET for Windows was applied for net-
work graphs modeling, for calculating network measures, and for testing net-
work hypotheses. 
Circulation of Elites: Empirical Evidence 
Analysis of changes in the membership of Ukraine’s political elite over the last 
20 years gave more than 25 possible patterns of elite circulation/replacement 
during six time slots (1990-1994, 1994-1998, 1998-2002, 2002-2006, 2006-
2007, and 2007-2011 which mostly correspond with the parliamentary and 
presidential elections). For this publication, it was decided to limit the period 
for the analysis of elite composition and changes to the last decade, specifically 
from 2002 to 2011. An additional argument for this restriction was that a con-
                                                             
2  The official webpage of Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine: <http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/ 
main/index> (accessed on April 24, 2012). 
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siderable share of elite members who was in power during the 1990s left in 
2002 due to various reasons, while ‘newcomers’ might be a group who will 
play an important role in the political life of Ukraine after the parliamentary 
elections in 2012. Table 1 below shows the patterns of elite circulation during 
the 2000s. 














271 -- -- Gone after 2006 
-- 160 160 “Survivors since 2006” 
62 62 -- Gone after 2007 
-- 121 -- Appeared only in 2006-2007 
39 -- 39 “Returners” 
-- -- 158 “Newcomers” 
 
Table 1 shows the changes in the composition of the national elite during the 
last decade, specifically throughout 2002-2006, 2006-2007, and 2007-2011. 
Several groups are defined: the first group (136 individuals) – “survivors since 
2002” – represents those members of the political elite who managed to stay in 
power from 2002 till 2011 surviving the events of 2004 and two subsequent 
parliamentary elections; the second group of 271 actors – “gone after 2006” – 
represents those who were replaced in 2006 (possibly as a result of the Orange 
Revolution); the third group of 62 elite members – “gone after 2007” – stayed 
in power after 2006, but left in 2007, whereas the fourth group (39 actors) – 
“returners” – represents those who were among the Kuchma-era elite, were 
replaced during the short 2006-2007 period, and then returned after the pre-
term elections in September 2007. Thus, the analysis demonstrates that after 
the 2004 events and 2006 parliamentary elections, which both were supposed 
to remove members of the old regime out of power, 198 deputies and ministers 
(39% of the entire political elite) from the Kuchma era remained on governing 
positions. However, 271 elite members (about 53%) were replaced with new 
members as for 2006. The parliamentary elections in 2006 brought 160 new 
individuals into top-positions, and this group – “Survivors since 2006” – man-
aged to stay in power till 2011. Finally, after the 2007 pre-term elections 
Ukraine’s political elite was filled up with 158 new members who also re-
mained in power despite presidential elections in 2010. 
The analysis of circulation raises the question about the relational structures 
of those ‘survivors since 2002’ whose surviving power has allowed them to 
keep top governing positions for the last decade. Additionally, it is necessary to 
research into the cohesion within the group of ‘returners’ who managed to 
come back into power in 2007 after a short break of 1.5 years. These groups, 
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along with the groups of survivors since 2006 and newcomers in 2007, will be 
compared for network measures in the next section.  
The Elite Network: ‘surviving power’ and ‘group cohesion’ 
In addition to the analysis of the composition of Ukraine’s political elite after 
the Orange Revolution, we also compared the individual biographies of the 
recent political elite aiming to identify possible ties based on common bio-
graphical experiences of elite members. Accordingly, individuals who attended 
the same faculty of the same university during overlapping periods of time; 
those who were or still are co-owners of the same company; those who were 
members of the same civic organization, etc. were considered as connected. In 
addition, kinship links and simultaneous employment in the same local gov-
ernment bodies were used to identify additional elements of the elite’s ‘affilia-
tion network’.3  
The complete network dataset contains 493 biographies of political elite 
members including all 450 deputies of the Ukrainian Parliament and the Minis-
ters (members of the Cabinet of Ministers) and high-level functionaries within 
the Presidential Secretariat. Their biographies were collected from several 
official sources that were considered reliable: web-pages of state institutions 
and political parties, periodicals and handbooks such as “Who is who in 
Ukraine”, and press interviews with them. Five types of ties were distin-
guished: political, business, civic, kinship, and educational. These ties were 
arranged into an affiliation network which is visualized along with the ‘staying 
power’ groups as attributes on Figure 1. 
As shown in Figure 1, the network of political elite members is highly con-
nected, at least in the core of the graph. Besides, black-squared nodes (‘survi-
vors 2002’) are concentrated mostly in the center of the graph, while white 
circles (‘newcomers’) stay at the periphery. To compare the connectedness of 
the four groups, we can look on densities.4  
  
                                                             
3  The general approach used in social network analysis focuses on ‘affiliation networks’ – 
ties between people and institutions that represent so-called corporate interlocks: When 
people combine several managing positions in different organizations, they maintain a more 
central and important status position within the network.  
4  Density of the network of its subgroups shows the share of connections out of all possible 
ties. It can be reflected in decimals or percentages. 
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Figure 1: Political Elite Network of 2007-2010 – by Subgroups 
 
Note. Colors refer to the groups of ‘circulation’: black squares – “survivors since 2002”, dark 
grey triangles – “survivors since 2006”, grey diamonds – “returners”, and white circles – 
“newcomers”. 
Table 2: Density of Groups in Elite Network 
Group by Surviving power  N Density 
“Survivors 2002” 136 0.0349 
“Survivors 2006” 160 0.0177 
“Returners” 39 0.0405 
“Newcomers” 158 0.0099 
 
As we see in Table 2, the group of “returners” is the densest subnetwork con-
taining about 4% of all ties that are possible among its nodes. The density of 
“survivors since 2002” is only slightly lower (3.5%) while the share of connec-
tions among “survivors 2006” is twice as low (1.8%). It might be one of the 
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explanations of how the group managed to stay in power for a decade – its 
members are closely linked with each other, thus insuring the cohesion and a 
kind of consensus within this group. Another group – “returners” – is also well 
connected, which indicates that the actors might have made collective efforts to 
return into power in 2007. In other words, it is easier to return as a member of a 
network than as a single player. 
Table 3: Degree Centrality vs. “Surviving Power”  
Name  Faction Group by Surviving Power* NrmDegree** 
YanukovychVF  PR 1 3,794 
Rybak  PR 1 3,726 
Bondarev  BYuT 4 3,455 
Hryniv  BYuT 3 3,252 
Holovatyi  PR 1 3,184 
Donchak  BYuT 2 3,117 
KliuyevAP  PR 1 2,981 
Gudyma  BYuT 3 2,913 
Koval  NUNS 1 2,778 
Yankovskyi  PR 1 2,778 
KyrylenkoVА NUNS 1 2,642 
Konovaliuk  PR 3 2,642 
Lavrynovych  PR 1 2,575 
Stetskiv  NUNS 3 2,575 
Shkiria  PR 1 2,575 
KostenkoYuІ NUNS 3 2,507 
Zayets  NUNS 3 2,439 
Skudar  PR 1 2,439 
Tarasiuk  NUNS 1 2,439 
Zarubinskyi  Blok Lytvyna 3 2,371 
*1-‘survivors’ since 2002; 2-‘survivors’ since 2006; 3-‘returners’; 4-‘newcomers’ 
**Normalized indicators were compared. Normalization of degree centrality and betweenness 
centrality allows for their comparison as calculated for the same actors. It is simply the per-
centage equivalent of the centralities.  
 
To check the leadership potential of the elite members within the network and 
in groups by surviving power, the centrality measures were calculated for each 
actor. This procedure reveals the nodes which are either ‘star-like’ possessing 
numerous direct connections, or serve as brokers among several network sub-
groups. The first approach corresponds with the degree centrality, and the 
second perspective is reflected in betweenness centrality (Scott 1991: 83-8). 
Centralities were calculated for the actors in groups by ‘surviving power’ as 
specified earlier5. 
                                                             
5  Degree centrality shows how well connected the actors are through their direct ties to the 
others, and the indicator assists in estimating direct influence of actors; betweenness cen-
trality is based on the number of times that a node lies along the shortest path between two 
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Table 4: Betweenness Centrality vs. “Surviving Power” 
Name  Faction 
Group by  
Surviving Power* 
NrmBetweenness** 
YanukovychVF  PR 1 5,176 
Rybak  PR 1 2,266 
Donchak  BYuT 2 1,856 
TymoshenkoYuV  Former PM 1 1,803 
Koval  NUNS 1 1,797 
Holovatyi  PR 1 1,763 
YushchenkoVA  Former President 1 1,583 
Shkiria  PR 1 1,466 
Akhmetov  PR 2 1,449 
Hryniv  BYuT 3 1,418 
Kulchynskyi  NUNS 1 1,335 
Tretiakov  NUNS 1 1,319 
Bilozir  NUNS 1 1,307 
Konovaliuk  PR 3 1,287 
KliuyevAP  PR 1 1,278 
OmelchenkoGO  BYuT 1 1,245 
Tarasiuk  NUNS 1 1,215 
Khmelnyckyi  PR 1 1,208 
Bondarev  BYuT 4 1,194 
Stretovych  NUNS 1 1,160 
*1-‘survivors’ since 2002; 2-‘survivors’ since 2006; 3-‘returners’; 4-‘newcomers’. 
**Normalized indicators were compared. Normalization of degree centrality and betweenness 
centrality allows for their comparison as calculated for the same actors. It is simply the per-
centage equivalent of the centralities. 
 
Figures 2-3 contain diagrams which display the variation of the centralities 
distribution among all actors in the network – between groups by surviving 
power.  
Comparing the distribution of degree centralities in four groups of elite 
members, we can argue that ‘staying power’ of ‘survivors 2002’ is to some 
extent assured by their high degree centralities. The values for all actors in this 
group are higher than for the actors in two other groups – “survivors 2006” and 
“newcomers”. Relatively high degree centralities of the “returners” also might 
assisted them to come back in 2007. This finding corresponds with the densi-
ties of these four subnetworks. 
The variation of betweenness centralities (Figure 3) in four groups by sur-
viving power shows that there are few leading actors who attract most of the 
structural power in the network. Although these leaders can be located in every 
groups – either among “survivors 2002” or among “newcomers” –, the highest 
betweenness centrality is held by the single actor in the first group. 
                                                                                                                                
others and shows gate-keeping position along with the opportunities to control the flow of 
resources, i.e. the exchange of information. 
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Figure 2: Normalized Degree Centralities Distribution in Four Groups 
 
Figure 3: Normalized Betweenness Centralities Distribution in Four Groups 
 
 
To conclude, the comparison of network actors by normalized centralities 
revealed key actors according to both approaches, direct influence and broker-
age power. A smoother distribution for degree centrality indices indicates that a 
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relatively high number of all elite members maintain many connections with 
their surrounding. However, a more rapid decline in the rankings by between-
ness centrality indices proves that only few actors can really benefit from their 
bridging positions between highly connected subgroups. Moreover, the top-20 
of centrality rankings, by degree and betweenness, contains several similar 
actors – who therefore hold beneficial positions from both perspectives of 
interpretation, centrality and power in the network.  
Conclusion 
The replacement of the elites, as a result of the ‘Orange Revolution’ in 2004 or 
after the parliamentary elections in 2006, was only partial because a particular 
group of elite members of the Kuchma period remained in power. To summa-
rize the empirical results of the changes in elite composition, the political elite 
composition changed in 2006 as follows:  
- 271 actors (over 50%) gone after 2006;  
- about 27% of all elite members (136 individuals) managed to remain in 
power throughout the last decade, since 2002; 
- 121 new members came into power exclusively for 2006 and left in 2007 
(about 25% of the total composition of elite); 
- another 160 actors came in 2006 and stayed till 2011 (over 25%); 
- a tiny group of 39 actors (less than 10%) left governing positions in 2006, 
but managed to return in 2007.  
The group of ‘survivors since 2002’ is better connected than ‘newcomers’, its 
members are rather central players within the whole network. Before the 2012 
parliamentary elections, the distribution of groups by their “surviving power” is 
as follows:  
- ‘survivors’ since 2002 = 28% (highly dense) 
- ‘survivors’ since 2006 = 32% (more fragmented) 
- ‘returners’ = 8% (highly dense) 
- ‘new-comers’ = 32% (lowest density) 
A rather intuitive finding is that ties between the elite members matter during 
radical changes of political regime because those who obtained positions in 
governing institutions tend to come at least in pairs (dyads) or as a network. 
‘Survivors since 2002’ rather serve as ‘brokers’ – they have higher between-
ness centrality scores; however, they are present among TOP-20 actors in terms 
of degree centrality as well. Actors of other groups (‘survivors’ since 2006, 
‘returners’ and ‘new-comers’) eventually appeared among TOP-20 by be-
tweenness and degree centrality, but there were the same persons, so we can 
assume that combinations of the influence strategies are necessary to access 
power and to be included in the network. Another option is to replace one 
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network with the other, though this way of elite circulation might be rather 
challenging due to the high cohesion between the current elite members.  
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